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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Case No. 900122-CA

vs.
GARY L. BOUCK,
De f endant/Appe11ant.

COMES NOW the Defendant, Gary L. Bouck, by and through his
lawyer of record, L. Long, and enters the following Brief on
Appeal:
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,
confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals over Appeals
taken from the Circuit Courts. This Appeal is from a final
Judgment entered in the Third Circuit Court, Layton Department
#892003830 TC, Judge Roger S. Dutson, wherein the
Defendant/Appellant was convicted of driving under the influence
of alcohol.

Defendant was tried by a jury and convicted of

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, in violation of section

41-6-44 of the Utah Criminal Code on February 7, 1990.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Prosecution failed to identify the Defendant during trial,.

2.

Is sitting at the counsel table during trial and during

identification of the alleged offender unduly suggestive.
3. The prosecutor presented insufficient evidence to convict
Gary L. Bouck for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT #6
In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT #14, SECTION 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 1. SECTION 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in

which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused
person, before final judgement, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall
not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about the 16th day of July, 1989, at approximately 1:20
a.m., Officer Cady, of the Utah Highway Patrol, discovered a
disabled vehicle positioned in the center divider, completely off
the paved portion of roadway at or near SR-15 and Burton in Davis
County, Utah.

The officer did not observe any driving pattern,

nor was there any indication of the amount of time the vehicle
had been at that location.
The occupant of the vehicle was asleep when the officer
approached the car, the engine was off, and the occupant had a
set of keys in his hand.

Officer Cady woke the occupant, and

subsequently arrested him for violating Section 41-6-44 of the
Utah Code, wherein the Defendant allegedly did operate and/or
have actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol and/or drugs to a degree which rendered
him incapable of safely driving said vehicle.

SUMMARY OF flRCTMEWT

The Appellant argues three basic points in his appeal•
First, the prosecution failed to properly identify the Defendant
during the trial on February 7, 1990 at 10:00 a.m..

This is an

flagrant violation of the Defendant's right to due process.
Since the person sitting next to defense counsel was never
identified as the Defendant, it was only assumed that the person
sitting next to the defense attorney was Mr. Gary L. Bouck.
Defendant was never arraigned on the crimes for which he was
charged, and therefore, the Court did not know who Gary L. Bouck
was.
Second, the circumstances under which the Defendant may have
been identified were at most circumstantial and at the least
unduly suggestive.

Circumstances such as these tend to increase

the risk of misidentification and are unreliable.
Third, given that the prosecutor did not identify Defendant at
trial, the prosecutor provided insufficient evidence for
conviction of Gary L. Bouck.

For these reasons the defendant

moves this Court to reverse Defendant's conviction on the grounds
surraaarized above and expanded upon below.

ARGUMENT
POIMT I
DID OFFICER CADY PROPERLY IDENTIFY THE DEFENDANT AS THE
PERSON GUILTY OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL?

An individual's right to a fair jury trial is protected and
guaranteed by the Utah and United States Constitutions, Article 1
section 12, and Amendments 6 and 14 respectively.

Prosecution

bears the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the
identity of the accused as the person who committed the offense.
In the instant case during the jury trial the arresting officer
failed to identify the Defendant as the person guilty of the
alleged offenses.

The trial court erred in its decision to

convict the Defendant by not recognizing the failure of the
prosecution to provide a specific in-court identification of the
Defendant.

Thus, Defendant contends the trial court improperly

entered judgment and sentence upon him.

In State v. Hill, 520

P.2d 618 (Wash 1974), it was determined that "it is axiomatic in
criminal trials that the prosecution bears the burden of
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the
accused as the person who committed the offense."
In the case at bar, the trial transcript, exhibit "A",
indicates that the defendant was never identified by the
prosecution as the man in the car at the time of Officer Cady's
arrest.

Therefore the jury could not conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that the man seated next to the lawyer at
counsel table was in fact the same man that was allegedly guilty
of driving under the influence of alcohol.

In examining the

Defendant's driver's license, Officer Cady testified that the
identity of the individual on the driver's license showed to be

Gary L. Bouck.

The prosecution erred at this moment in the

trial, however, in that the officer never testified in court that
the man seated next to the lawyer at counsel table was Gary L.
Bouck.

Officer Cady did state that the identity of the driver

matched that of the person pictured on the driver's license, but
failed to identify the man sitting next to counsel during the
trial as Gary L. Bouck.

Clearly, then, the Defendant's right to

due process was infringed upon in that there was no specific
identification at trial.
It is a matter of well defined constitutional law that a
criminal Defendant has a due process right to fair identification
procedures.

The Defendant submits that it is the primary concern

of this Court is to protect a citizen's due process right to a
fair identification procedure and that the identification be
reliable.

In the case State v. Myers. P.2d 1252, (Arizona 1977)

it has been decided that "it is essential that totality of
circumstances surrounding identification indicate defendant has
not been mistakenly identified."

Furthermore, Justice Hay

commented in Myers, Id. at 1256, wherein he states:
It is a well established rule of law that a criminal
defendant has a due process
right to a fair
identification procedure. See e.g. United States v.
Wade. 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149
(1967); State v. Dessureault, 104
Ariz. 380, 453 P.2d 951, 104 Ariz. 439, 454 P.2d 981, 397
U.S. 965, 90 S.Ct. 1000, 25 L.Ed.2d 257 (1970). The

primary concern of the law is that the identification
reliable. It is essential that the totality of
circumstances surrounding the identification indicate

be

that the defendant has not been mistakenly identified.
State v. Strickland. 113 Ariz.445, 556 P.2d 320 (1976);
State v. Dessureault, supra.

POINT II
THE PROCEDURES USED TO IDENTIFY GARY L. BOUCK WERE UNDULY
SUGGESTIVE
The circumstances under which the Defendant was identified
were circumstantial at best and were unduly suggestive.

In the

case Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, Justice Powell delivered the
opinion of the Court;
Some general guidelines emerge from these cases as
to the relationship between suggestiveness and
misidentification. It is first of all apparent that
the primary evil to be avoided is a "very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Simmons
v. United StatesP 390 U.S., at 384....Suggestive
confrontations are disapproved because they increase
the likelihood of misidentification, and unnecessarily
suggestive ones are condemned for the further reason
that the increased chance of misidentification is
gratuitous.

The Defendant was not directly identified by anyone at trial.
As a matter of course, the Defendant will identify himself at his
arraignment.

In the instant case, however, there was no

arraignment.

Upon receiving counsel's Appearance, Judge Dutson

set the matter for pre-trial and did not arraign the Defendant.
The sole witness for the State did not specify that the person
sitting at counsel table was Gary L. Bouck, the prosecutor did
not point out to the Court or to the jury that the person sitting
at the counsel table was Gary L. Bouck, and counsel for the

defense did not specifically identify the person sitting at the
counsel table as Gary L. Bouck.

The circumstances under which

the Defendant was identified were circumstantial at most, and
unduly suggestive at the least.

As has been stated in several

cases, overly suggestive identification circumstances leads to a
greater opportunity for misidentification and therefore denies
the Defendant his due process right and prejudices him.

POIHT III
THE PROSECUTOR PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR CONVICTION
The evidence the Prosector presented at trial was insufficient
to convict the Defendant.

At no time was the person sitting at

counsel table identified as Gary L. Bouck.

It is fundamental law

that the Defendant be present for his trial and have the
opportunity to confront witnesses.

In order for this to be

achieved, the Defendant must be identified at trial and must have
the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against him.

The only

witness in this matter was the police officer who failed to
specifically identify the person at counsel table as the Gary L.
Bouck, and therefore, the evidence which the prosecution put
before the Court was insufficient to convict Gary L. Bouck of
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.

CQWCIfPSIOIt
In the instant case, three questions remain:

1. Did the

prosecution identify the person sitting at counsel table as the

Defendant; 2. Was the identification procedure used specific or
was it entirely circumstantial and suggestive; and, 3. Was the
evidence the prosecutor put before the presiding judge sufficient
to convict Gary L. Bouck of Driving Under the Inluence. The
prosecution at no time called any witnesses who identified the
Defendant as Gary L. Bouck, did not identify the Defendant
himself, and did not have the Court identify the Defendant.
Under usual circumstances, the Defendant will identify himself at
arraignment, but since the trial judge did not arraign Gary L.
Bouck, but simply set a pre-trial date for him, the Defendant did
not identify himself.
Given the circumstances under which Gary L. Bouck was assumed
to have been identified, that is, sitting with counsel at the
counsel table during trial, it is obvious that the circumstances
under which he was identified are at most circumstantial and at
the least unduly suggestive.
During the trial in this matter, the prosecution failed in its
prima facie case to identify the person sitting at the counsel
table as the Defendant.

The Appellant submits that the

prosecution failed in its prima facia case to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person sitting at counsel table is the
same person who was arrested for Driving Under the Influence, and
therefore, presented insufficient evidence with which a
conviction of Driving under the Inluence could be reached.

The

defendant contends that this conviction should be reversed on

the grounds and for the reasons that he was not identified at
trial, the circumstances under which he may have been identified
were completely suggestive, and that the prosecution did not
provide the Court with sufficient evidence with which a
conviction may be reached.

All these things, taken in their

entirety have denied Gary L. Bouck his right to due process and
have unfairly prejudiced his case.

This case should be reversed

as a matter of well defined law.
THE PRICE OF FREEDOM IS CONSTANT VIGILANCE
DATED this 31st day of May, 1990

L-L
L. Long
Lawyer for Defendant/Appellant
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